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I. INTRODUCTION
On June 6, 2002, Attorney General John Ash-
croft called the Internet a "double-edge sword."'
Although Ashcroft acknowledged that the In-
ternet offers boundless educational, cultural, and
creative capabilities, he also observed that it none-
theless exists as the "most pernicious medium for
obscenity." 2 During the Federal Prosecutors' Sympo-
sium on Obscenity, Ashcroft affirmed that as a soci-
ety, Americans overwhelmingly support the vigor-
ous enforcement of federal laws against Internet
obscenity.3 Indeed, a 1998 survey on First Amend-
ment indecency doctrine found that obscenity
and indecency on the Internet is a concern of
eighty-five percent of all Americans. 4 At the Ob-
scenity Symposium, the Office of the Attorney
General confirmed that it is committed to
* The author would like to thank Andrea Ottomanelli,
Dan Lee, and William Silva for their guidance and support.
I Memorandum from Attorney General John Ashcroft, to
the Federal Prosecutors' Symposium on Obscenity (June 6,
2002) [hereinafter Ashcroft Memo] (on file with author)
("On the one hand, [the Internet] is an amazing tool that
[gives] children . . . access to cultures and ideas that are be-
yond their everyday experiences. On the other hand, it also
serves as a conduit for child exploitation and obscenity that
respects no boundaries and recognizes no jurisdictional
lines.").
2 Id. ("Obscenity invades our homes persistently through
the mail, phone, VCR, cable TV, and now the Internet ....
Never before has so much obscene material been so easily
accessible to minors.").
3 Id. (suggesting most Americans do not want their
homes "besieged by an avalanche of obscenity" and that be-
cause of the inherent danger online obscenity poses to chil-
dren, parents have become more vocal about developing a
solution to fight obscenity in cyberspace).
4 Kelly M. Doherty, WWW.OBSCENITY.COM: An Analysis
of Obscenity and Indecency Regulation on the Internet, 32 AKRON
L. REV. 259, 265 (1999) (citing Brian M. Werst, A Survey of the
First Amendment 'Indecency' Legal Doctrine and Its Inapplicability
to Internet Regulation: A Guide for Protecting Children from Internet
Indecency After Reno v. ACLU, 33 GONZ. L. REV. 207, 209
"bring[ing] the full weight of the Department of
Justice to fight against [online] child pornogra-
phy and obscenity. '5
Even before the Justice Department's recent
commitment, Congress recognized the growing
problem of Internet obscenity and attempted to
draft legislation that was aimed at regulating sexu-
ally explicit material on the Internet. Ultimately,
Congress' goal was to hold web publishers crimi-
nally accountable for any obscene speech dissemi-
nated over the Internet. 6 After several attempts to
pass legislation, however, Congress nonetheless
failed to regulate the Internet due to a combina-
tion of two factors: a comprehensive disregard for
constitutional rights and a lack of insulation of
our elected officials from the political process. 7
Obscene and indecent material on the Internet
is quickly growing into a virtual epidemic." Be-
(1998)).
5 See Ashcroft Memo, supra note 1; see also Joe
Obenberger, Ashcroft's Porn War, J.B. Obenberger & Associ-
ates LLP, at http://www.melonfarmers.co.uk/inash.htm (last
modified July 14, 2002) ("The attendance [at the National
Cybercrime Law Conference in Chicago] was overpoweringly
dominated by FBI agents, Assistant U.S. Attorneys, and other
prosecutorial and law enforcement personnel .... I surpris-
ingly found myself in the midst of the anti-porn camp as
they ... discussed their order of battle.").
6 Mark C. Alexander, The First Amendment and Problems of
Political Viability: The Case of Internet Pornography, 25 HARV. J.L.
& PUB. POL'Y 977, 978 (2002) (stating that as Internet por-
nography has come to epitomize societal ills, Congress has
failed the American people by attempting to federalize regu-
lation of sexually explicit material on the Internet).
7 Id. at 977-978 ("In seeking politically expedient symbol-
ism without regard to the Constitution, Congress has failed
[at regulating pornography on the Internet].").
8 See Declean McCullagh, Ashcroft's Hard Line on Hardcore,
WIRED NEWS, at http://www.wired.com/news/politics/
0,1 283,44398,00.html (last modifiedJune 9, 2001) (reporting
that a number of Republicans in the House Judiciary Com-
mittee asked Ashcroft to prosecute online obscenity). Rep.
Bob Goodlatte (R-VA) was apparently the most persistent,
claiming that the failure of the Clinton administration to en-
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tween 1998 and 2000, the estimated number of
pornographic websites rose from 28,000 to over
60,000. 9 A study performed by Computer World
found that the number of individual visitors to
porn sites recently jumped more than 30 percent,
from twenty-two million visitors in December 1999
to twenty-eight million in February 2001.11 It is es-
timated that Internet porn nets approximately
two billion dollars per year, which helps make the
porn industry in the United States more profita-
ble than the National Football League, National
Basketball Association, and Major League Base-
ball combined.'' Using the parameters set forth
by the Constitution and further articulated by the
United States Supreme Court, the regulation of
obscene or indecent speech has been viewed as a
substantial government interest 1 The Depart-
ment of Justice appears to be using the very same
roadmap that led Congress astray.' Constitu-
tional regulation is possible, but its success will de-
pend on who bears the responsibility of its en-
forcement. 14
Established by the Communications Act of 1934
to regulate interstate and international communi-
cations by radio, television, wire, satellite and
cable, the Federal Communications Commission
("FCC") is an independent United States govern-
force obscenity laws has led to a proliferation of both on and
off line obscenity. Id. Goodlatte supported Ashcroft's deci-
sion to use Department of Justice resources to "combat this
cyberattack on our nation's children." Id.
9 See Alexander, supra note 6, at 981; see also Paul Lomar-
tire, It's a Dirty Business (And You'd Be Surprised Who's In It),
THE PALM BEAci POST, Aug. 15, 2002, at 1 (interviewing Wil-
lian Lyon, executive director of the Free Speech Coalition).
When asked how many porn websites were on the Internet,
Lyon responded: "If I had to guess, I'd say 500,000, and 10
more are starting tip as we speak." Id.
10 See Juleka Dash, Fomer Dot Con Workers Find Home at
Porn Sites, COMPUTER WORLD, atwww.computerworld.com
(last modified June 11, 2001) (citing a Jupiter Matrix study
on porn site web traffic).
I I Lomartire, supra note 9 (citing a May 2001 New York
Times report that estimates U.S. consumers spend between
$10 billion and $14 billion annually on pornography). The
amount spent on pornography in the United States includes
Internet porn as well as hotel, cable, movies, DVDs, phone
sex, adult toys, and magazines. Id.
12 See Paris Adult Theater v. Slaton, 414 U.S. 881 (1973)
(holding that states have a long-recognized legitimate inter-
est in regulating the use of obscene material in local com-
merce and in all places of public accommodation, as long as
these regulations do not run afoul of soecific constitutional
provisions); United States v. Thirty-Seven Photographs, 402
U.S. 363, 378 (1971) ("In an unbroken series of cases ex-
tending over a long stretch of this Court's history it has been
accepted as a postulate that the primary requirements of de-
ment agency' 5 directly responsible to Congress.' 6
This comment will provide an overview of Con-
gress' unsuccessful attempts to create laws that
regulate the Internet, and it will explain how the
Department of Justice is ultimately headed to-
wards the same fate. Further, it will suggest how
Congress can use the Federal Communications
Commission to enact lawful regulations and to
provide an effective means to control the spread
of obscene material in cyberspace.
In any effort to control the dissemination of
content over the Internet, it is vital to understand
how the medium works and how it has progressed
since its origin. Thus, Part II will provide both a
brief history of the Internet and will discuss the
current state of this medium. Developing regula-
tions that potentially prohibit certain forms of
speech requires an understanding of how the Su-
preme Court has traditionally treated obscene
and indecent speech within different forms of me-
dia. Therefore, Part III will outline the laws of ob-
scenity and indecency, and will attempt to further
define and apply those laws in a virtual world. Part
IV provides an overview of the First Amendment
and further details how the Supreme Court has
developed medium-specific First Amendment
rules. As part of this discussion, this comment will
cency may be enforced against obscene publications.").
I McCullagh, supra note 8 (discussing how Representa-
tive Bob Goodlatte and other House conservatives supported
both the Department ofJustice's plan to attack Internet por-
nography as well as the Communications Decency Act, which
the Supreme Court deemed unconstitutional in 1997 be-
cause it violated the First Amendment right to free speech).
14 Alexander, supra note 6, at 977 ("Internet pornogra-
phy shocks the public and demands attention from politi-
cians, yet it also enjoys a clear measure of constitutional pro-
tection. Like other incendiary issues from generations past,
Internet pornography poses a political riddle: where is the
intersection of political liability and constitutional legiti-
macy?").
15 See 47 U.S.C. §151 (2001) ("[For the purpose of...
centralizing authority heretofore granted by law to several
agencies and by granting additional authority with respect to
interstate and foreign commerce in wire and radio communi-
cation, there is created a commission to be known as the
'Federal Communications Commission,' which shall execute
and enforce the provisions of this chapter.").
I", See Federal Communications Commission, About the
FCC, at http://www.fcc.gov/aboutus.html (last visited Sept.
10, 2003) ("The [Federal Communications Commission] was
established by the Communications Act of 1934 and is
charged with regulating interstate and international commu-
nications by radio, television, wire, satellite and cable. The
FCC'sjurisdiction covers the 50 states, the District of Colum-
bia, and U.S. possessions.").
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analyze how Internet content should be protected
within this structure. Parts V and VI will discuss
previous Congressional attempts and the Attorney
General's recent mandate to regulate online ob-
scenity and will look at how both approaches yield
to problems of "political theater" and unconstitu-
tionality. Finally, Part VII will illustrate how Con-
gress and the FCC should work together to ensure
that lasting legislation is not only created, but also
enforced by a government agency that has rele-
vant expertise regarding both the law and the
technology. This comment ultimately seeks to ad-
dress how Congress can give the "expert agency"
the ability to protect the public's interest in fight-
ing online obscenity and indecency by assuring
that the legislative mistakes of the past are not re-
peated.
I. THE HISTORY AND DEVELOPMENT OF
THE INTERNET
A. Brief History of the Internet
In the 1960s, the Department of Defense de-
signed a project called the Advanced Research
Project Agency Network ("ARPANET") wherein it
sought to enable computer communication be-
tween government officials and universities via
overlapping channels. 7 The Department linked a
series of computers together and created a net-
work using phone lines that was so strong that it
was designed to withstand a nuclear attack.'I The
project's purpose was to provide a means of com-
munication between government officials and re-
searchers in the event that the government's com-
puter network was damaged by a natural disas-
17 Maureen O'Rourke, Fencing Cyberspace: Drawing Borders
in a Virtual World, 82 MINN. L. REV. 609, 616 (1998).
18 Doherty, supra note 4, at 260.
19 Alexander, supra note 6, at 979.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id. at 979-980.
23 O'Rourke, supra note 17, at 615-616 (stating in 1986,
the National Science Foundation set up its own network
("NSFNET") which was complete with a high-speed commu-
nications backbone that linked machines together). By 1990,
NSFNET connected to ARPANET and the Internet's back-
bone was created. Id.
24 The term "network of networks" is often used to de-
scribe the Internet. See O'Rourke, supra note 17, at 616;
BRYAN PFAFFENBERGER, WORLD WIDE WEB BIBLE 38 (2d ed.
1996); Michael J. Schmelzer, Note, Protecting the Sweat of the
Spider's Brow: Current Vulnerabilities of Internet Search Engines, 3
ter. 11 ARPANET was designed to be a self-main-
taining network that automatically re-routed gov-
ernment communications without the need for
human intervention if certain links became un-
available.2 0 However, without manual assistance,
neither the sender nor the receiver of informa-
tion would know the location of the other 2' or the
path that the information traveled. 22
As this government project evolved, computers
from universities, businesses, and other govern-
ment agencies all over the world merged into one
main system. 2-3 By 1983, this "network of net-
works" had come to be established as the In-
ternet. 24 Today, the Internet enables anyone con-
nected to it to communicate with anyone else sim-
ilarly connected without regard to limitations
caused by differences in equipment or physical lo-
cation.25 To reach the information contained on
the Internet, one must first obtain access through
a service provider.2 6 The computer is linked to
the service provider by a modem. 27 Once the com-
puter is connected to the service provider, a user
can view content such as electronic mail, bulletin
boards or sites on the World Wide Web ("web").28
As one commentator noted, understanding how
the web operates within the structure of the In-
ternet is as simple as thinking of each website as a
book.29 The home page operates as the table of
contents, while the other pages are similar to
chapters, which can be accessed simply by clicking
on their entry in the table of contents. 30 An indi-
vidual who creates and operates the website is
known as the site's "publisher" and the act of
uploading speech or content onto the site is
called "publishing."3 1
B.U.J. Sci. & TECH. L. 12 (1997).
25 Alexander, supra note 6, at 979-980.
26 Marshall Brain, How Web Servers Work: The Internet, at
http://www.howstuffworks.com/web-server2.htm (last visited
Sept. 10, 2003) (stating a typical service provider is a com-
mercial organization that sells Internet access to commercial
and home users).
27 Doherty, supra note 4, at 261.
28 Id. (explaining that the World Wide Web operates as a
series of sites that contain information and usually offers
links to additional information or related sites). "Every docu-
ment on the Web has a unique address called Uniform Re-
source Locator (URL) and the documents are stored on serv-
ers throughout the world." Id.
29 O'Rourke, supra note 17, at 622.
30 Id.
"1 Id.
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B. The Current State of the Internet
Today, the Internet is comprised of over 50,000
networks linked to at least nine million host com-
puters in ninety countries around the world.3 2
The online community is also continuing to grow
at a remarkable pace. 3  The number of Internet
users has risen from 300 since the days of
ARPANET in 1983, to 36,739,000 in 1998.34 More-
over, the Internet's surge as a communication
tool is not limited to any specific age group.35 In
the United States alone, 70.5 million of the ap-
proximately 202 million adults populating the
country use the Internet.36 In addition, one re-
cent study predicts the number of Internet users
ages 2 to 17 will exceed 44 million by the year
2005.3 7 Though it is difficult to estimate the num-
ber of people who connect to the Internet each
day, sources indicate that the Internet allows mil-
lions of users to communicate with each other
and to access a mass of information all virtually
within seconds.38
ARPANET established the decentralized basis
for the modern Internet.19 In essence, what
makes the Internet unique from other forms of
modern communications is that there is "no cen-
tralized storage location, control point, or com-
munications channel.."40 Because the Internet was
designed as a series of independent networks
linked together, the task of determining where all
the information is located or where it is going is
32 See Shea v. Reno, 930 F. Supp. 916, 925 (S.D.N.Y.
1996) (describing the origins of the Internet in a suit filed by
a publisher of an electronic newspaper who raised a First
Amendment challenge to the section of the Communications
Decency Act that criminalizes the use of interactive computer
services that send or display patently offensive materials).
-3 See Matthew Gray, Internet Statistics: Growth and Use of
the Web and the Internet, at http://www.mit.edu/people/mk-
gray/net/internet-growth-summary.html (1996) (last visited
Sept. 10, 2003) (citing statistics that show the growth of In-
ternet hosts from year to year increases by the millions).
34 Doherty, supra note 4, at 262 (commenting that the
increased use of the Internet was most evident in September
of 1998 when Congress agreed to release Independent Coun-
sel Kenneth Star's report on the alleged relationship between
President Clinton and Monica Lewinsky). The number of
users accessing CNN.com before the release peaked at
340,000 per minute, which set a record of most users per
minute. Id.
35 Id.
36 Id.
'17 See Michael Pastore, 40 Percent of America's Kids Online,
CYBERATLAS, at http://cyberatlas.internet.com (last modified
June 8, 2000) (citing research that shows children's access to
the Internet from school is expected to surpass their home
virtually impossible. 4 1
III. DEFINING OBSCENITY AND INDECENCY
IN A VIRTUAL WORLD
A. The Miller Test
In 1973, the Supreme Court pronounced that
obscenity was an appropriate subject for law en-
forcement and established a test for defining "ob-
scenity" in the landmark decision Miller v. Califor-
nia.42 The well-known three-pronged test set out
by the Court to prohibit obscenity is:
(a) whether the average person, applying contempo-
rary community standards, would find that the work,
taken as a whole, appeals to the prurient interest; (b)
whether the work depicts or describes, in a patently of-
fensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by the
applicable state law; and (c) whether the work, taken as
a whole, lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scien-
tific value.
44 3
By incorporating "community standards" in favor
of "national standards," the Court observed that it
would "neither be realistic nor constitutionally
sound to read the First Amendment as requiring
that people of Maine or Mississippi accept public
depiction of conduct found tolerable in Las
Vegas, or New York City." 44 Chief Justice Burger,
in rejecting the national standard, reasoned that
what may appeal to the "prurient interest" or be
"patently offensive" is essentially a question of
fact; however, he also observed that our nation is
access as soon as recent "classroom wiring initiatives" are
widespread). The research also shows that this expected in-
crease can be traced to families being more willing to
purchase Internet access knowing that its primary use will be
for their children's education. Id.
"I O'Rourke, supra note 17, at 616-617.
39 Id. ("The system was initially designed to be decentral-
ized to guard against the disruption of communication flow-
ing through it. It continued to be so as large numbers of in-
dependent computer and network operators connected to
it.").
411 Alexander, supra note 6, at 980.
41 Id.
42 See Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
4- Id. at 24 (commentating that the Court acknowledged
the inherent dangers of regulating any form of expression
and therefore legislation designed to regulate obscene
materials must be carefully limited).
44 Id. at 30 ("Under a National Constitution, fundamen-
tal First Amendment limitations on the powers of the States
do not vary from community to community, but this does not
mean that there are, or should or can be, fixed, uniform na-
tional standards of precisely what appeals to the 'prurient in-
terest' or is 'patently offensive.'").
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too big and diverse for the Supreme Court to ex-
pect that a uniform set of standards will apply to
each state. 45 In discarding the national standard
in Miller, the Chief Justice combined notions of
both tradition and practicality. 46 He noted the im-
portance of local juries to speak the minds of the
communities that they represent. 47 Further, he
suggested that the nation's variety of communities
demanded a variety of community standards,
rather than one voice speaking for one nation.48
Until recently, Congress had applied this test
only when regulating broadcasting and telecom-
munications. 49 Congress has attempted to apply
the Miller test in regulating the Internet, but has
yet to draft legislation that successfully passes con-
stitutional scrutiny. 5° In particular, the question
of which standard to use when applying the Miller
test-national, local, or otherwise-has caused
much controversy. 5'
B. United States v. Thomas- The Miller Test
Applied to the Internet
The Miller holding in 1973 was premised upon
a notion of obscenity existing in a real and physi-
cal world that was conceived decades before the
Internet was created.5 2 Thus, the question re-
45 Id. (holding that a state requirement to structure ob-
scenity proceedings around a national community standard
would be futile) (emphasis added).
46 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1005 (explaining that the
Court's basis for its decision was founded on the concept that
local juries should represent only their community). The
traditional basis for the decision is grounded in the notion
that different geographic areas have always had different
ideas as to what conduct is tolerable in public. Id.
47 Id.
48 Miller, 413 U.S. at 32 ("[D]iversity is not to be stran-
gled by the absolutism of imposed uniformity.").
49 Julie Van Camp, Indecency on the Internet: Lessons from
the Art World, ENTERTAINMENT, PUBLISHING, AND THE ARTS
HANDBOOK, 256 (Stephen F. Breimer et. al. eds., 1996).
50 Id. ("[The Miller language] has been used by Congress
in the regulation of broadcasting and telecommunica-
tions ... [b]ut the Congressional attempt to pass Constitu-
tional muster by incorporating this language into such legis-
lation has not always succeeded in the courts.").
51 See generally Patrick T. Egan, Virtual Community Stan-
dards: Should Obscenity Law Recognize the Contemporary Commu-
nity of Cyberspace?, 30 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 117 (1996) (stating
networked computers have begun a communication revolu-
tion comparable to Gutenberg's invention of the printing
press). "Time spent in Cyberspace has altered the concept of
community for computer users. For over twenty years, courts
have applied a geographically local community standard
when employing this test. Pornography transmitted over the
Internet, however, raises [new] questions regarding which
mains whether its holding is applicable to obscen-
ity as it exists in a virtual world. In 1996, the Sixth
Circuit reviewed whether the Miller test should be
used in determining when online obscenity can
be prohibited, or in the alternative, whether a
"virtual community standard" could be used to
judge sexually explicit content on the Internet.53
In United States v. Thomas, a couple was convicted
of distributing obscene images and videos via
their own bulletin board system from their house-
hold.5 4 They scanned sexually explicit photo-
graphs taken from magazines into computer files,
and clients paid a membership fee to access them
on the bulletin board. 55 After the U.S. Postal In-
spector received complaints, the Thomas' were ar-
rested and convicted of violating federal obscenity
law.5 6 On appeal to the Sixth Circuit, the Thomas'
argued that the nature of the sexually explicit ma-
terial at issue should be determined by a virtual
community standard, not the standard of the
Western District of Tennessee.5 7 The court re-
jected the Thomas' arguments and held that the
defendants' knowledge of the subscribers' loca-
tion was sufficient to establish a nexus to the fed-
eral district in Tennessee.5 8
The Sixth Circuit's holding in Thomas was fact-
specific and therefore limited. 5 9 Thus, questions
community's standard applies in cyberporn prosecutions."
Id.
52 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1006.
53 United States v. Thomas, 74 F.3d 701 (6th Cir. 1996).
54 Id. at 705.
55 Id.
56 Id. ("As a non-member, [Agent David Dirmeyer, the
Postal Inspector] viewed a screen that read 'Welcome to
AABBS, the Nastiest Place On Earth,' and was able to select
various 'menus' and read graphic descriptions of the GIF
files and videotapes that were offered for sale .... ). The
Agent used his computer in Memphis to download GIF files
that depicted indecent sex scenes. Id.
57 The Thomases argued for a new definition of commu-
nity, "one that is based on the broad-ranging connections
among people in cyberspace rather than the geographic lo-
cale of the federal judicial district of their criminal trial." Id.
at 711-712. The basis for their argument was that without this
new community definition, there would be a chill on pro-
tected speech because web operators cannot select who gets
the materials they make available online and therefore they
will be forced to censor their materials. Id.
58 See id. at 709; see also United States v. Bagnell, 679 F.2d
826, 830 (11th Cir. 1982) (holding that "there is no constitu-
tional impediment to the government's power to prosecute
pornography dealers in any district into which the material is
sent.").
59 Thomas, 74 F.3d at 712 ("[U]nder the facts of this case,
there is no need for this court to adopt a new definition of
'community' for use in obscenity prosecutions involving elec-
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about whether a "virtual community standard"
could ever be adopted still remain unanswered.
Consequently, any federal law that regulates ob-
scenity on the Internet must address which com-
munity should judge whether the sexually explicit
material on the Internet is obscene.60
C. Which "Community" Should Govern Online
Obscenity?
The position that obscenity should be judged
community-by-community is well supported, espe-
cially now after the development of the Internet."'
In this sense, imposing uniformity to online ob-
scenity regulation could have a negative effect on
the diversity of the material that is available on-
line. 62 However, even if uniform national stan-
dards are to be dismissed, the question of whether
the local community or an alternative "virtual
community" should govern online regulation re-
mains contentious. There are essentially two po-
sitions that represent the "local community stan-
dard." An analysis of their efficacy will demon-
strate why the "virtual standard" represents a
more practical solution.
The first position, known as "recipient jurisdic-
tion," is that the appropriate jurisdiction and
community standard would depend on where the
sexually explicit material was received or
downloaded. 6 4 Besides creating uncertainty as to
tronic bulletin boards.").
60 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1(108.
61 When applying community standards to an obscenity
case, the Miller Test is still governing law. See Thomas, 74 F.3d
at 710-711 (acknowledging that the first prong of the Miller
obscenity test is a general principle and well-settled law).
62 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1012 n.188 ("[A] national
standard would place-almost return-the United States Su-
preme Court to a position of being the ultimate arbiter of
what sexually explicit material on the Internet is obscene.
The Court's days of struggling to define obscenity on a case-
by-case basis are over, thankfully.").
63 See generally, Thomas, 74 F.3d at 701.
64 Alexander, supra note 6, at 10(19 (noting that"[u]nder
this approach, the only sexually explicit material that may be
distributed across the internet would be that which is toler-
ated in the least permissive jurisdiction in the country," and
therefore runs afoul to the First Amendment obscenity law
because it chills speech).
65 Id.
66 Id. ("The recipient's jurisdiction would leave open the
door for prosecutions almost anywhere, without the sender
having knowledge of the fact that the material had ever been
downloaded there. Such prosecutions would improperly chill
First Amendment rights .... ).
applicable standards, this position makes the dis-
tributor subject to jurisdiction in any location
within the United States.65 A U.S. Attorney seek-
ing to prosecute a distributor in a particular lo-
cale would have the ability to do so simply by ac-
cessing the distributor's website in his own com-
munity.611 It seems apparent that recipient juris-
diction would not be feasible because this virtual
presence would not act as an appropriate substitute
for actual presence by the distributor. 67 Moreover,
the chilling effect on speech would be far reach-
ing. 68
In the alternative, "provider's jurisdiction" has
been argued to be an effective standard by which
online obscenity should be measured. 6 1 The basis
for this position is that the government should
prosecute the individual in the physical location
where he has made available the obscene material
on the Internet. 7° Admittedly, this approach of-
fers some tangible benefits. First, it allows commu-
nities to control the acceptable content that is to
be distributed within their physical locality. 7 1 Fur-
thermore, this type of jurisdiction has a practical
approach-while the communications that we
would be concerned with appear on the Internet
in a borderless world, the content is still created
or at least uploaded by a real individual in a real
place. 72 Despite these benefits, however, this op-
tion is still considerably flawed. 73 Instead of too
much government control, this approach pro-
67 See Pres-Kap, Inc. v. System One, Direct Access, Inc.,
636 So.2d 1351, 1353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that
an assertion of personal jurisdiction on the action of an indi-
vidual downloading materials into a forum instead of based
on a distributor's direct contact with a forum is "wildly be-
yond the reasonable expectations of computer users").
"8 See William S. Byassee,Jurisdiction of Cyberspace: Applying
Real World Precedent to the Virtual Community, 30 WAKE FOREST
L. REV. 197, 210 (1995) ("If each cyberspace user must gov-
ern her speech in accordance with the most restrictive of
these communities, then either much will remain unex-
pressed, or ... the virtual community will restrict access of
the members of those restrictive jurisdictions to entire con-
versational subjects or to membership in the community it-
self.").
69" Alexander, supra note 6, at 1013 (arguing that "pro-
vider'sjurisdiction" is a better option than "recipient's juris-
diction" because the local community would have the ability
to regulate itself and remain within the dictates of Miller).
7) See Timothy S. T. Bass, Obscenity in Cyberspace: Some. Rea-
sons for Retaining the Local Community Standard, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 471, 493494 (1996).
71 Id. at 483-484.
72 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1013.
73- Id.
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vides essentially no government control at all.7 4
Distributors of obscene material could simply
move to the least restrictive jurisdictions, post
their content on the Internet, and manage to cir-
cumvent any regulations that may have been set
in other jurisdictions. 75
In seeking to adopt a uniform standard to
judge obscene material found online, the defend-
ants in the Thomas case developed the concept of
a "virtual community." 76 At trial, the Thomas' ar-
gued that there should be a separate community
standard for cyberspace because it is a non-physi-
cal space that still acts as a "community" to its
users. 77 Fundamental to the principle of commu-
nity standards is the notion that a community re-
lies on the proximity of its members.78 In an In-
ternet community, which is not bound by any geo-
graphical borders, it is axiomatic that these mem-
bers should not be judged by the standards of
those communities with geographical bounda-
ries.79 Several commentators, noting the flaws in
local and national community standards, have
demonstrated that a solution to the discrepancy
in the law would be for the law not to view a com-
puter user as part of his or her geographic com-
munity while they are online, but rather to be
judged in terms of the community in which he is
actually engaged.8"
Admittedly, the concept of a virtual community
does have its drawbacks. As already stated, the re-
cipients of communications that are transmitted
via the Internet represent an extremely diverse
population, and therefore the creation of a uni-
form "cyber citizen" to act as a model for deter-
74 Id. at 1014 (commenting that this is essentially the re-
verse of the "recipient jurisdiction" problem, instead of too
much control there is no control whatsoever).
75 Id. (implying that the communities would lose control
over this media and that this is precisely the problem that
Miller intended to prevent with its three-prong test).
76 Thomas, 74 F.3d at 711-712.
77 Byassee, supra note 68, at 198-199.
78 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1030 ("Computer technol-
ogies allow individuals to create unique communities of peo-
ple who share similar interests and wish to communicate with
each other about those interests.").
79 Byassee, supra note 68, at 199 (arguing Internet users
are even more connected to each other than physical neigh-
bors and therefore the citizens of the Internet community
should be given the opportunity to determine what is ob-
scene for themselves).
80 See generally Anne Wells Branscomb, Anonymity, Auton-
omy, and Accountability: Challenges to the irst Amendment in
Cyberspaces, 104 YALE L.J. 1639, 1653-54, 1672 (1995) (assert-
ing that the virtual community's standards should govern an
mining which online communications are ob-
scene would be very difficult.8 ' Without meaning-
ful definition of the standards within this "virtual
community," the Miller test would be inoperable
and the rights protected by the First Amendment
would be violated.8 2 Accordingly, Congress would
need to answer several precise questions in order
to define this community accurately. For example,
who resides in a virtual community?8 3 Is it any per-
son who has ever accessed information on the In-
ternet or instead, is it a more frequent user?8 4 Is it
any person who accesses any kind of information,
or is it limited to strictly information that is sexu-
ally explicit?8
5
D. FCC v. Pacifica Foundation: Current Law on
Broadcast Indecency
Short of obscenity, indecent speech is constitu-
tionally protected, but it may be regulated if the
content contravenes a compelling state interest.8 6
A Supreme Court decision regarding free speech
over electronic communication was Federal Com-
munications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation,
where the Court held that FCC regulations
prohibiting "indecent" or "obscene" speech on
the radio do not violate the First Amendment.8 7
After a radio broadcast of comedian George Car-
lin's monologue, "Filthy Words," the FCC deter-
mined that certain words depicting excretory and
sexual activities violated the FCC's definition of
broadcast indecency.88 The FCC defines broad-
cast indecency as "language or material that, in
context, depicts or describes, in terms patently of-
obscenity analysis, at least where no harmful consequences
can be demonstrated in a geographical community); but cf.
Donald T. Stepka, Obscenity On-Line: A Transactional Approach
to Computer Transfers of Potentially Obscene Material, 82 CORNELL
L. REV. 905, 907 (1997) (arguing the law need not recognize
a "virtual community" for purposes of the community stan-
dards analysis set forth in Miller, but instead courts need to
re-examine their understanding of online transactions to
avoid inequitable decisions under the existing law).
81 Branscomb, supra note 80, at 1668.
82 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1010-1011.
83 Id.
84 Id.
85 Id.
86 Doherty, supra note 4, at 269 (maintaining that inde-
cent material often includes offensive sexual expression
which does not meet the Miller definition of "obscene" when
distributed among adults).
87 Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica
Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
88 Id. at 729-730.
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fensive as measured by contemporary community
standards for the broadcast medium, sexual or ex-
cretory activities or organs."' 9- The Pacifica Court
adopted the FCC's definition of "indecency" and
held that the Commission's regulation of inde-
cency was not overbroad. 90 In his majority opin-
ion, Justice Stevens wrote that the FCC properly
classified the broadcast as indecent because the
content heard on the radio was offensive and
shocking.9'
It is a violation of federal law to broadcast ob-
scene or indecent programming.9'2 This prohibi-
tion is set forth in Title 18 of the United States
Code at §1464. ," Congress has conferred the au-
thority to the Federal Communications Commis-
sion to enforce this section of the Code.94 How-
ever, at this time, §1464 does not include the au-
thority to regulate obscenity or indecency on the
Internet.9'5 As a medium, is the Internet similar
enough to broadcasting communications that the
Pacifica holding should apply to online communi-
cations as well? 96
In its holding, the Pacifica Court noted that
there should be special treatment for such inde-
cency prohibition when dealing with broadcasting
for four reasons: (1) children have access to ra-
dios and are often unsupervised by parents; (2)
radio receivers are in the home, a place where cit-
izens' privacy interests are entitled to extra defer-
ence; (3) unconsenting adults may tune into a sta-
tion without any warning that offensive language
8( 8 F.C.C. Rcd. 704, 705 n.10 (1993).
9(1 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726.
) I Id. at 731 n.2.
92 See generally, Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 726 (holding that the
FCC order did not violate broadcaster's First Amendment
rights even if broadcast was not obscene because the FCC was
correct in prohibiting the indecent monologue because of
the special factors presented by or inherent in the broadcast
media).
93 See 18 U.S.C. §1464 ("Whoever utters any obscene, in-
decent, or profane language by means of radio communica-
tion shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more
than two years, or both.").
94 See 47 U.S.C. §303(m)(1)(D) ("Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, the Commission from time to time,
as public convenience, interest, or necessity requires,
shall... [h]ave authority to suspend the license of any opera-
tor upon proof sufficient to satisfy the Commission that the
licensee. . . has transmitted superfluous radio communica-
tions or signals or communications containing profane or ob-
scene words, language, or meaning .... )
,5 Section 303 grants the FCC specific regulatory author-
ity over broadcast communications. See 47 U.S.C. §303(r)
("Except as otherwise provided in this chapter, the Commis-
sion from time to time, as public convenience, interest, or
will be broadcast; and (4) due to a scarcity of spec-
trum space, the government must license spec-
trum space in the public interest.97
The first two reasons given by the Court show
remarkable similarities in how computers and the
Internet are utilized in today's society. In the
same way that radios or televisions are found in
the home, many children also have unsupervised
access to computers and the Internet in the home
as well. 8
Notwithstanding these similarities, the district
court in ACLU v. Reno discussed how the remain-
ing factors of "invasiveness" and "scarcity" mark
significant differences between the two media.99
Chief Judge Sloviter questioned whether one can
accidentally call up a website or e-mail program in
the same manner one might accidentally hear
something on the radio. The Chief Judge noted
that "[e]ven if a broad search will, on occasion,
retrieve unwarranted materials, the user virtually
always receives some warning of its content, signif-
icantly reducing the element of surprise or 'as-
sault' involved in broadcasting." 100 Chief Judge
Sloviter found the "element of surprise" factor sig-
nificantly more compelling in an indecency analy-
sis than the previous two factors that dealt with
the unsupervised nature of the media within
one's home."" Commentators have disagreed
with the Chief Judge's position concerning
whether or not inadvertent exposure to the In-
necessity requires, shall ... make such rules and regulations
and prescribe such restrictions and conditions, not inconsis-
tent with law, as may be necessary to carry out the provisions
of this Act .... "). At this time, these FCC powers and duties
have not been interpreted to apply to the Internet and the
FCC has not read its general rulemaking provision to be con-
sistent with the Congressional grant of authority under this
section. See id.
96 Eric S. Slater, Broadcasting on the Internet: Legal Issues for
Traditional and Internet-Only Broadcasters, 6 MED. L. & POL'Y
25, 30 (1997) (asking whether traditional law should be ap-
plied to the Internet). "Is the Internet similar to traditional
media (such as broadcasting), or is the Internet different
enough to warrant a different set of rules and laws to govern
it?" Id.
97 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 731 n.2.
98 Van Camp, supra note 49, at 256-257 ("[The first two]
factors have obvious relevance to the Internet. Many children
have access to computers in the home and are often un-
supervised by parents.").
99 ACLU v. Reno, 929 F. Supp. 824 (E.D. Pa. 1996).
'00 Id. at 852.
101 Id. at 844-845 (stating it is highly unlikely that a very
young child will be randomly 'stirfing' the web and come
across 'indecent' or 'patently offensive' material).
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ternet is possible.10 2 In finding that the Internet is
inherently different then broadcasting in terms of
its "assault-factor," one commentator compared
the Internet to a bookstore-"sex on the Internet
is not segregated and signposted like in a book-
store, and it is not [as] easy to avoid."' 1 3 Despite
these arguments, the Supreme Court found Judge
Sloviter's argument persuasive. Additionally,
courts have also recognized that, unlike the radio
airwaves, the Internet is not a scarce resource. In
Turner Broadcasting Systems v. FCC, the Supreme
Court held that because forty million users across
the world have the capacity to access the Internet
at low cost, the medium could not be considered
"scarce." These combined factors led the Su-
preme Court in Reno to dismiss the online applica-
tion of Pacifica and to afford the Internet First
Amendment protection similar to that given to
the print media.
IV. FIRST AMENDMENT IMPLICATIONS TO
ONLINE REGULATION
A. Principles of the First Amendment
In light of Miller and Pacifica, determining how
obscenity and indecency laws could successfully
be applied to the Internet requires a strong un-
derstanding of the First Amendment. The First
102 See Alexander, supra note 6, at 982 ("[C]hildren on-
line may have free and unhindered access to almost all of the
available adult content on the Internet. This is true regard-
less of whether the child is curious and Internet savvy or
merely surfing the Web . . . to learn more about his or her
favorite hobbies or sports.").
103 See id. at 982 ("Some heavy-duty imagery is incredibly
easy to stumble upon .... [Y]outh do not have to be all that
active in exploring the Internet to run across sexual material
inadvertently."); see also David Finkler, Kimberly Mitchell &
Janice Wolak, Online Victimization: A Report on the Nation's
Youth, Crimes Against Children Research Center (2001) (on
file with author) (detailing a broad study about child victimi-
zation online where children are inadvertently exposed to
online indecency). The study provides an example of an
eleven-year-old boy who, while looking for game websites,
typed in "fun.com," and was exposed to a pornographic web-
site. Id.
104 U.S. CONST. amend. I ("Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the
free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press, or of the right of the people peaceably to assem-
ble, and to petition the Government for a redress of griev-
ances.").
105 Miller, 413 U.S. at 23 (holding that obscene speech
receives no First Amendment protection).
106 Compare Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Consumer
Amendment provides, "Congress shall make no
law ...abridging the freedom of speech."1 4 As
Miller v. California illustrates, the Supreme Court
has concluded that the First Amendment does not
protect all kinds of speech. 10 5 There are two
broad classifications of speech: content-neutral
and content-based speech. 106 If government regu-
lation of speech is content-based, that is, relating
to the communicative impact of the speech, that
regulation will be subjected to strict scrutiny.10 7
On the other hand, if the government action is
"content-neutral," that action would most likely
be subject to a significantly less rigid review.""'
The Supreme Court has held that, in order for
a regulation to survive strict scrutiny, the govern-
ment must show that its regulation is necessary to
serve a compelling state interest and is narrowly
drawn to achieve that end. 0 9 In essence, the gov-
ernment regulation must be the least restrictive
means by which to further the state's interest.
Thus, the strict scrutiny standard has been ap-
plied to any government regulation that restricts
the content of an individual's speech. 10
The doctrines of overbreadth and vagueness
are also important in determining whether a gov-
ernment regulation of speech violates the First
Amendment. A statute is overbroad if it bans
speech that could constitutionally be forbidden
but, in doing so, also bans speech that is pro-
tected by the First Amendment. II A statute would
Council, 425 U.S. 748 (1976) (dealing with content-based
classification of speech) with Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147
(1939) (dealing with content-neutral classification of
speech).
107 See WILLIAM KAPLIN, THE CONCEPTS AND METHODS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 55 (1992) (noting that when courts
apply strict scrutiny, they look closely at the government ac-
tion compared to its justifications and are likely to deem the
action unconstitutional). Of all of the judicial standards of
review that courts use to guide the disposition of particular
cases, strict scrutiny is the most extreme and shows the least
deference towards the constitutionality of a particular policy.
Id. at 55-56.
108 Id. at 172 (suggesting that because "content-neutral"
restrictions do not involve viewpoint discrimination they do
not merit the strictest scrutiny).
109 See generally Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S.
568 (1942); Ark. Writer's Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S.
221 (1987).
110 See generally Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the
N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 118 (1991) (re-
stating that the government must show a compelling state in-
terest to justify a regulation of content-based speech).
Ill See Kaplin, supra note 107, at 171 (explaining the
overbreadth doctrine allows a party to challenge a regulation
on its face despite the fact that the regulation would otherwise
be constitutional as applied to the conduct engaged in by that
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be unconstitutionally vague if the conduct forbid-
den by it is so unclearly defined that a reasonable
person would have to guess at its meaning." 12
B. Medium-Specific First Amendment Analysis
The Supreme Court treats various forms of
communication differently when applying First
Amendment standards. 13 Traditionally, print me-
dia has been free from government regulation.' 14
In Pacifica, the Court used a less strict level of
scrutiny towards Carlin's radio broadcast because
of the distinct characteristics of the broadcast me-
dium. 15 The Supreme Court applied similar First
Amendment protection to cable television as well
because, like broadcasts, cable is accessible to chil-
dren and has a potentially pervasive presence in a
viewer's home.' 16
The Court addressed the telecommunications
medium in Sable Communications v. FCC" 7 In Sa-
ble, the Supreme Court held that regulations
prohibiting "indecent" communication on inter-
state commercial telephone lines violated the
First Amendment."" The Supreme Court held
that a portion of the statute, codified at §223(b)
of the Telecommunications Act,' 19 was constitu-
tional because it banned obscene speech that is
not protected by the First Amendment. 120 None-
party) (emphasis added).
112 Id. (stating courts require a greater degree of clarity
under the speech clause because a vague regulation may
"chill" the free speech rights more than other general regula-
tions).
113 See Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367,
386 (1969) ("Although broadcasting is clearly a medium af-
fected by a First Amendment interest, differences in the char-
acteristics of new media justify differences in the First
Amendment standards applied to them.") (internal citations
omitted).
114 Note, The Message in the Medium: The First Amendment
on the Information Superhighway, 107 HARV. L. RFv. 1062, 1071
(1994) ("[T]he print medium ... enjoys virtually absolute
protection from government restriction. Even when a news-
paper possesses an economic monopoly and therefore has
the power to exclude particular speech from its pages, the
Court has recognized the primacy of publishers' First
Amendment rights over others' claims of access.") (internal
citations omitted).
115 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 748.
116 See Denver Area Educ. Telecomm. Consortium, Inc.
v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 744 (1996) (holding cable television is
as pervasive and accessible to children as broadcast media).
117 492 U.S. 115 (1989).
118 See id. at 131 (holding that the statute's denial of
adult access to telephone messages are not obscene, and
therefore the ban does not survive strict scrutiny); see also Van
Camp, supra note 49, at 256-258.
theless, the Court found that the "dial-a-porn" me-
dium was less pervasive than the broadcast me-
dium in Pacifica because callers must take affirma-
tive steps to receive dial-a-porn messages.1 21 In up-
holding the FCC's regulation of indecent speech,
the Court used a strict scrutiny standard in analyz-
ing telephone communication.1 2 2
C. What Kind of First Amendment Protection
Should the Internet Receive?
Even if the Internet is unique from other tradi-
tional forms of media, it is nonetheless most
closely akin to telephone communication.1 23 In
rejecting the notion that the Internet should re-
ceive the same regulatory status as the broadcast
media, Chief Judge Sloviter in Reno posited that
the Internet was inherently related to the tele-
phone. 124 Initially, there are obvious physical simi-
larities in the manner by which each form of com-
munication is accessed. The Internet, like the
telephone, can be accessed through telephone
lines via a modem that is linked to a computer. 125
More significantly, with both forms of communi-
cation, the user must affirmatively search for the
information. 12 6 Just as a caller would need to dial
a number to complete his call, a computer user
must either type in a web address or perform an
119 47 U.S.C. § 223(b) (2000).
121 Sable, 492 U.S. at 126 (holding "sexual expression"
that is indecent, but not obscene, is protected by the First
Amendment).
121 Id. at 117-119, 124 (defining a dial-a-porn service as
an adult's use of the telephone to access and listen to inde-
cent recordings for a price).
122 Doherty, supra note 4, at 271-272 ("While the court
acknowledged that protecting the well-being of minors is a
compelling government interest, it found that alternatives ex-
isted that were less restrictive than a complete ban on inde-
cent speech, which would deny adult access.").
123 SeeJenniferJ. Lee, The Internet and the First Amendment
Values: Reno v. ACLU and the Democratization of Speech in the
Marketplace of Ideas, 22 COLUM.-VLA J.L. & ARTS 61, 66-67
(1997) (analyzing that the user actively searches for informa-
tion when accessing the Internet through the telephone).
124 See Reno, 929 F. Supp. at 852-853 ("[T]he evi-
dence . . . show[s] that Internet communication, while
unique, is more akin to telephone communication, at issue
in Sable, than to broadcasting, at issue in Pacifica, because, as
with the telephone, an Internet user must act affirmatively
and deliberately to retrieve specific information online.").
"[Two-way communication over the Internet is] analogous to
a telephone party line, using a computer and keyboard
rather than a telephone." Id. at 835.
125 See id. at 832; see also Lee, supra note 123 at 67.
126 Slater, supra note 96.
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Internet search using his own key words. In light
of these similarities to the telephone, as well as
the differences to broadcast media, it is apparent
that Sable should guide the courts in determining
the level of First Amendment protection afforded
to the Internet. Consistent with Miller, the Sable
court reaffirmed the constitutionality of prohibit-
ing "obscenity," while holding that the prohibi-
tion of "indecency" would violate the First
Amendment. 127 Sable recognized that banning in-
decent speech was simply not the "least restrictive
means" to further the government's interest in
protecting children. 128 With this comparison be-
tween the Internet and the telephone in mind,
one can now review how existing statutory obscen-
ity law has successfully been applied to the In-
ternet.12 9
D. Successfully Applying Obscenity Law to the
Internet
Several existing federal statutes governing ob-
scenity have already been successfully applied to
the Internet. 13 0 Two statutes, in particular, that
have been found to be relevant to the Internet 13 1
are: 18 U.S.C. §1460, which makes it a crime to
possess obscene material with the intent to dis-
tribute, 1 2 while 18 U.S.C. §1462 makes it a crime
to distribute or receive obscene materials through
a common carrier in interstate or foreign com-
merce. 3" Additionally, 18 U.S.C. §1464 prohibits
127 Sable Communications, 492 U.S. at 131 ("Because the
statute's denial of adult access to telephone messages which
are indecent but not obscene far exceeds that which is neces-
sary to limit the access of minors to such messages, we hold
that the ban does not survive constitutional scrutiny.").
128 Id.
129 See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1460-1469 (1994 & Supp. 1997).
10 See Doherty, supra note 4, at 278-279; see also Robert F.
Goldman, Put Another Log on the Fire, There's a Chill on the In-
ternet: The Effect of Applying Current Anti-Obscenity Laws to Online
Communications, 29 GA. L. REv. 1075, 1108-11 (describing that
the sections of the statute are "medium-specific" and some
are found to be relevant in their application to the Internet).
13' Doherty, supra note 4, at 278-279.
132 18 U.S.C. §1460 (1994) ("Whoever ... in the ...
territorial jurisdiction of the United States... knowingly sells
or possesses with intent to sell an obscene visual depiction
shall be punished by a fine in accordance with the provisions
of this title or imprisoned for not more than two years, or
both.").
133 Id. at §1462.
134 See id. at §1464 ("Whoever utters any obscene, inde-
cent, or profane language by means of radio communication
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than
two years, or both."); see generally Charles D. Ferris & Ter-
broadcasting "obscene, indecent, or profane lan-
guage."13 4 Finally, 18 U.S.C. §§1465 and 1466 pro-
hibit one from knowingly "transporting or engag-
ing in the business of selling obscene, lewd, or
filthy material through interstate commerce."'1 35
V. CONGRESSIONAL ATTEMPTS TO
REGULATE OBSCENITY ON THE
INTERNET
A. Communications Decency Act
In the midst of rapid technological advance-
ment, Congress assumed the responsibility of en-
suring that the fastest growing communications
medium in history did not violate the traditional
legal notions of obscenity under the Miller test. 3 6
Perhaps in response to the perception that a
child's access to sexually explicit material was infi-
nite, Congress' first attempt at regulation focused
on what it considered to be its most compelling
interests-"the protection of children from por-
nography and the prosecution of those who pro-
mote the sexual exploitation of children."' -1 7 The
Communications Decency Act ("CDA") was origi-
nally a Congressional addition to the Telecommu-
nications Act of 1996.138 The CDA, which was in-
cluded in Title V of the Act, was proposed by Sen-
atorJames Exon (D-Neb) in an effort to make the
Internet "superhighway a safe place for our chil-
rance J. Leahy, Red Lions, Tigers, and Bears: Broadcast Content
Regulation and the First Amendment, 38 CATH. U. L. REV. 299
(1989) (arguing that broadcast content requires a limited
amount of government oversight).
135 18 U.S.C. §1465 (1994 & Supp. 1997) ("Whoever
knowingly transports or travels in . . . interstate or foreign
commerce or an interactive computer service ... in or affect-
ing such commerce for the purposes of sale or distribution of
any . . . matter of indecent or immoral character, shall be
fined under this title or imprisoned.., or both."); Id. §1466
("Whoever is engaged in the business of selling or transfer-
ring obscene matter, who knowingly receives or possesses
with intent to distribute any [material], which has been ...
transported in interstate or foreign commerce, shall be pun-
ished by imprisonment . . . or by a fine under this title, or
both.").
136 Alexander, supra note 6, at 977-978.
137 John Kriegar, Will the Third Time Be a Charm or a
Strike? Regulating Sexually Explicit Content on the Internet, NEV.
LAWYER, 12 (Aug. 2002).
138 See Reno, 521 U.S. at 857-859 ("The major compo-
nents of the statute have nothing to do with the Internet;
they were designed to promote competition in the local tele-
phone service market, the multichannel video market, and
the market for over-the-air broadcasting.").
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dren and our families to travel on."'I ' The statute
criminalized "the knowing transmission of ob-
scene or indecent images" and "the knowing
sending or displaying of patently offensive
messages" to anyone, or in front of anyone, under
the age of 18.141 The potential consequences for
such acts were fines up to $250,000 and up to two
years imprisonment. 141
Very early on, it was clear that the bill's provi-
sions would not survive the Supreme Court's First
Amendment scrutiny. 142 Several members of Con-
gress suspected that the bill was unconstitu-
tional.143 President Clinton was also aware of the
bill's flaws, but he nonetheless chose to sign it
into law in 1996.144 With the proposed state inter-
est of protecting children from access to pornog-
raphy and criminalizing those who exploit chil-
dren in this manner, no politician was able to vote
against this legislation, despite its suspected un-
constitutionality, because of the fear of being la-
beled as a public figure that "supported Internet
pornography." 145
The constitutionality of the CDA was immedi-
ately challenged by several advocacy groups on
the basis of the First Amendment right to free
speech.146 These groups moved for a temporary
restraining order in federal district court in Penn-
sylvania seeking to enjoin enforcement of the in-
decency portion of the CDA. 47 Proponents of the
bill argued that the law protected children from
objectionable content that is readily available on-
line.1 48 The court rejected this argument and the
federal government lost as a three-judge panel
granted the order, finding that the provisions in
the bill were unconstitutional because they were
both vague and overbroad in their use of the
terms "indecent" and "patently offensive."'149
The Supreme Court reviewed the constitution-
139 Doherty, supra note 4, at 273.
140 47 U.S.C. §223(a), (d).
141 Id.
142 Alexander, supra note 6, at 984.
143 See Stephen Chapman, Clinton is No Fiend of Free
Speech, CHI. TRn.,July 3, 1997, at 23 (stating that Newt Ging-
rich denounced the bill for infringing on free speech); see
also Alexander, supra note 6, at 993, n.100 (stating that Sen.
Patrick Leahy received a letter from then-acting Assistant At-
torney General Kent Markus that the proposal was an at-
tempt to "impose criminal sanctions on the transmission of
constitutionally protected speech.").
144 Alexander, supra note 6, at 984-985.
145 Id. at 978.
146 Plaintiffs included the American Civil Liberties
Union, Computer Professionals for Social Responsibility,
ality of the CDA on the government's appeal and
upheld the district court's decision by a 7-2 major-
ity.' 5 1 The Court held that the provisions at issue
were impermissible content-based restrictions on
speech.1 5' As a result, the CDA indecency provi-
sions of 47 U.S.C. §223(a) and (d) were invali-
dated. In its holding, the Court identified why the
Internet was subject to strict scrutiny, while the
broadcast media was subject to a less stringent
standard of review.152 The three reasons advanced
by the Court were: (1) the Internet has no history
of government regulation; (2) the Internet has no
scarcity of available frequencies; and (3) the In-
ternet does not "invade" an individual's home. 5 --
The Court concluded, "[t]he growth of the In-
ternet has been and continues to be phenomenal
[and the] interest in encouraging freedom of ex-
pression in a democratic society outweighs any
theoretical but unproven benefit of censor-
ship." 154
B. Child Online Protection Act
When the Supreme Court declared the CDA
unconstitutional, Congress revisited the issue and
drafted the Child Online Protection Act
("COPA") in 2000. COPA made it a federal crime
for commercial web publishers who "knowingly
and with knowledge of the character of the mate-
rial .. . [use] the World Wide Web [to make]
available to any minor ...any material that is
harmful to minors."'1 5 In response to the quick
judicial dismantling of the CDA, Congress sought
to make substantive changes to COPA that would
ultimately withstand constitutional scrutiny. Con-
gress drafted the language of COPA as narrowly as
possible to avoid the pitfalls of overbreadth and
vagueness. 15  The resulting legislation differed
Inc., Electronic Frontier Foundation, Electronic Privacy In-
formation Center, Human Rights Watch, Institute for Global
Communications, Journalism Education Association, Na-
tional Writers Union, and Planned Parenthood Federation of
America, Inc. See Doherty, supra note 4, at 273-274.
"47 ACLU, 929 F.Supp. 824.
148 Alexander, supra note 6, at 985.
149 ACLU, 929 F.Supp. at 824.
'5" Reno, 521 U.S. at 844.
151 Id. at 868.
152 Doherty, supra note 4, at 275.
153 Reno, 521 U.S. at 868.
'54 Id. at 885.
155 47 U.S.C. §231 (a)(1) (2000).
15( Alexander, supra note 6, at 989.
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from the CDA in three fundamental ways: (1)
COPA applied to material only displayed on the
World Wide Web, whereas the CDA applied to all
communications on the Internet (i.e. electronic
mail); (2) COPA only covered commercial com-
munications; and (3) COPA limited and defined
the breadth of the speech that would be "harmful
to minors."1 5
7
The American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU")
filed suit in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
challenging the constitutionality of COPA.158 The
district court enjoined enforcement of COPA,
holding it unconstitutional because of its restric-
tions on protected adult speech.1 59 The court
held that COPA was neither narrowly tailored nor
the least restrictive means to achieve the govern-
ment's interests for four reasons: (1) COPA did
not apply to any foreign websites that may contain
offensive material; (2) credit card authorizations
were ineffective because many minors possessed
credit cards legitimately; (3) the legislation ap-
plied to all web content and was therefore over-
inclusive; and (4) filtering software used by par-
ents was less burdensome than COPA and seen as
just as effective by the court. 161 On appeal, the ap-
pellate court affirmed the district court's holding,
but did so on different grounds. 6 ' The Third Cir-
cuit held that COPA was unconstitutional based
on its overbroad "contemporary community stan-
dards" and its definition of "harmful to mi-
nors."'162 The appellate court reasoned that the
application of the contemporary community stan-
dards test to the Internet resulted in an unconsti-
tutional burden on protected speech because it
applied a geographical standard to a non-spatial
157 Kriegar, supra note 137, at 23.
158 ACLU v. Reno, 31 F.Supp.2d. 473 (E.D. Pa. 1999).
159 Id. at 495.
16() ACLU v. Reno, 217 F.3d 162, 172 (3rd Cir. 2000).
161 Alexander, supra note 6, at 992.
162 ACLU, 217 F. 3d at 173-174.
163 Id.
164 Alexander, supra note 6, at 992-993 (reporting that
the Supreme Court's ruling was limited because it did very
little to clarify the law of regulating Internet pornography).
165 See Ashcroft v. ACLU, 535 U.S. 564 (2002) ("COPA's
reliance on community standards to identify material that is
harmful to minors does not by itself render the statute sub-
stantially overbroad for First Amendment purposes.").
166 Id.
167 See Children's Internet Protection Act, Pub. L. No.
106-554 (2000).
168 47 U.S.C. §254(h) (2001).
169 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1016 ("Filtering technol-
ogy was developed in the mid-1990s to block access to por-
medium. 11
The Supreme Court's holding, though limited,
did not allow COPA to be enforced.1 64 Before re-
manding the case, the Court addressed the nar-
row question of whether the COPA's reliance on
"community standards" to identify what material
is harmful to minors would cause the legislation
to be overbroad.16 5 Six Justices observed that, al-
though Congress had cured some of the defects
of the CDA, there remained significant problems
with vagueness and overbreadth. 166
C. Children's Internet Protection Act
The Children's Internet Protection Act
("CIPA") is Congress' latest attempt to regulate
online material that is deemed to be harmful to
minors. 167 CIPA requires that all public schools
and libraries that have public computers with In-
ternet access must install filtering software.10 8 Fil-
tering technology is designed to block any site
that contains an objectionable word or mate-
rial. 169 The installed filters would prevent individ-
uals from accessing visual depictions that are "ob-
scene" or "harmful to minors."' 71 1 On its face,
CIPA seemed to represent an improvement from
CDA and COPA because it avoided using vague
and overbroad standards. 17 ' However, it quickly
became clear to many that CIPA was no more
than Congress attempting to provide a simple so-
lution to a serious problem. Unfortunately, even
as the technology becomes more advanced, filter-
ing programs do not necessarily perform the func-
tion for which they were designed. 172 The Ameri-
can Library Association ("ALA") has been fighting
nography .... Today the most common form of filtering is
based on a website's address.").
170 Kriegar, supra note 137, at 24 ("Moreover, the law
permitted the determination of 'material deemed harmful to
minors' to be made by the school, school board, library or
other responsible authority making the required certifica-
tion."). The facility was required to install these filtering
software programs byJuly 1, 2000 or risk losing federal find-
ing. Id.
171 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1016-1017 (commenting
that any site that contained objectionable content would be
blocked by the filtering program). Examples are keywords
such as "breast," "sex," or "XXX." The filtering software
would block both the objectionable sites, as well as sites con-
taining the terms "chicken breast strips," "Middlesex
County," and "Super Bowl XXX." [d.
172 Id. at 1016 (suggesting "Congress seemed to be tak-
ing a step in the right direction by changing its focus from
federal regulation to empowering local communities .... ).
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CIPA since its origin because the technology
raises serious First Amendment concerns when it
blocks both objectionable content on the Internet
as well as constitutionally protected speech.17 3 In
2002, the ALA's challenge to CIPA finally came
before a federal district court in Pennsylvania. 74
The majority held that CIPA violated First Amend-
ment protections and was unconstitutional be-
cause of vagueness and overbreadth. 175 The court
concluded that filters did protect minors from ob-
scene content on the Internet, but that the
software would "incorrectly fail to block a substan-
tial amount of speech." 1715 Subsequently, even be-
yond the constitutional arguments, the effective-
ness of filtering programs has often been ques-
tioned in their efforts to shield children from in-
appropriate content on the Internet. 177 In addi-
tion to blocking sites with acceptable content, a
child could still potentially access obscene con-
tent on the Internet despite running his search
on a computer that uses a filtering program. 78
Commentators have concluded that if this case
were to be granted an appeal to the Court of Ap-
peals for the Third Circuit, CIPA would likely fail
constitutional scrutiny because the filtering tech-
nology does not work as it is intended. 179
D. Future Challenges For Congress
There is much to learn from Congress' failed
173 Id. at 1016 n.206 (reporting that the American Li-
brary Association has opposed filtering programs). "As early
as 1998 . . .when Senator John McCain introduced the
'School Filtering Act,' the American Library Association
spearheaded the opposition to the bill because it believes
that schools and libraries should make their own choices
about which websites are acceptable and whether the filter-
ing needs to occur at all." Id.
174 See American Library Ass'n, Inc. v. United States, 201
F. Supp. 2d 401 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
175 Kriegar, supra note 137, at 24 (reporting the Court
ruled that, because of the problems with vagueness and over-
breadth, CIPA was deemed to have not been narrowly tai-
lored to address the government's interest in regulating con-
tent on the Internet).
176 American Library Ass'n, Inc., 201 F. Supp. 2d at 401.
177 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1018 (implying that even
if "technological advances can combat the problem of over-
blocking, keyword filtering has another drawback: it only
screens for text. To be completely effective it must check for
images as well.").
178 Doherty, supra note 4, at 297 (stating that the
software cannot block every questionable site, and as a result,
a determined child could bypass the filter and find indecency
on the Internet). "Like anything else in the technological
world, these software programs are not perfect." Id.
179 Id. (commenting that while in theory filters are an
legislative attempts at regulating the Internet. 8 0
Foremost, Congress should realize that the In-
ternet poses unique challenges to lawmakers that
cannot be "addressed with kneejerk legislation
such as the CDA, [COPA], and CIPA."' 8'1 In re-
sponse to public outcry that the Internet was be-
coming a dangerous place for our country's
youth, Congress ignored constitutional precedent
and created the most politically expedient solu-
tion in each legislative attempt.1 82 The conse-
quence of these actions was "high political thea-
ter, but no law."'l 3 Undoubtedly, there is a basic
tension between politics and the Constitution: no
soundbite answer passes constitutional muster,
but politics and politicians still demand soundbite
answers.'18 4 Thus, as the country is faced with this
ripe political issue, Congress' challenge for the fu-
ture is not to simply pass more unconstitutional
legislation in order to provide an immediate re-
sponse, but rather to address the problem with a
legislative solution that is politically appealing,
practical, effective, and constitutionally sound.'8 5
The concept of drafting legislation that protects
both our children and the First Amendment is
not unrealistic if Congress chooses to follow three
guidelines. First, Congressional legislation of any
kind should not be an effort to "get around" the
Supreme Court's decisions, but rather to "work
within" the limits set by the Court.1 86 Second,
Congress needs to ensure that, in addition to
excellent idea, it remains difficult to put theory into prac-
tice).
181) Statement of Senator Patrick Leahy, Committee on
Senate Judiciary, Hearing on "Stopping Child Pornography:
Protecting Our Children and The First Amendment" (Oct. 2,
2002) [hereinafter Stopping Child Pornography Statement] (on
file with author) (stating efforts by Congress in the past, such
as the CDA and COPA, have violated constitutional limits
and have been nullified by the courts). "Each time the Su-
preme Court has faced this task, it has provided valuable gui-
dance to the Congress that we should heed." Id.
181 Kriegar, supra note 137, at 25.
182 Alexander, supra note 6, at 984, 994 ("Few politicians
are willing to stand up against a politically expedient bill be-
cause it is unconstitutional .... Politicians first support solu-
tions/bills that are politically appealing, then those which are
politically viable, but they consider constitutionality most
often as an afterthought.").
181 Id.
184 Id. at 979.
185 Id. at 995.
186 148 CONG. REc. §4391-01 (Daily Ed. May 15, 2002)
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy of the Senate Judiciary
Committee on introduction of the Hatch-Leahy "PROTECT
ACT" of 2002). Senator Leahy stated that as a former prose-
cutor, "I am more interested in making real cases that pro-
tect children than making new First Amendment law. Every-
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working within constitutional structure, the pro-
posed bill sets up proper parties to effectively en-
force and prosecute the new provisions. 18 7 Finally, as
the Internet continues to thrive, it is imperative
that Congressional regulations "[do] not stifle,
but embrace, freedom of expression."' 8 8 The fol-
lowing sections will outline how the Department
of Justice's ("DOJ") recent mandate over online
obscenity continues to ignore constitutional pre-
cedent. Further, the comment will address how
Congress, in its capacity as a rulemaker, can fol-
low the previous three guidelines to draft legisla-
tion that allows the DOJ and FCC to work to-
gether to fight the problem of obscenity on the
Internet.
VI. THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S
ACTION PLAN
A. Federal Prosecutor's Obscenity Symposium
On June 6, 2002, the Executive Office of the
United States Attorneys sponsored a Federal Pros-
ecutors' Obscenity Symposium which provided a
forum for U.S. Attorneys to discuss the current
state of the pornography industry and the legal
challenges of investigating and prosecuting on-
line obscenity. 89 Attorney General John Ashcroft
one wants to protect our children, but we need to do it with
cases and laws that don't get tossed out in court. It is tempt-
ing to rush to some 'quick fix,' but we owe our children more
than just a press conference on this matter. We owe them
careful and thoughtful action." Id.
187 Id. at §§4392-4393.
188 Kriegar, supra note 137, at 25 (discussing the vast pos-
sibilities Congress has before it to regulate the Internet's con-
tent). "Whatever the choice, it is paramount that the Internet
continue as a robust source of information and that any con-
tent-based regulation must be carefully tailored to address
the specific harm for which it is intended." Id.
189 Jay Sekulow, Bruce Taylor & Donna Rice Hughes,
Steps in the Right Direction to Combat Online Obscenity, The
American Center for Law and Justice Newsletter, at http://
www.aclj.org (last modified July 19, 2002) [hereinafter
Sekulow].
190 Statement by Attorney General John Ashcroft, Por-
nography Victims Awareness Month, Department of Justice
(May 1, 2001) (on file with author) (stating in the year 2002,
the Department of Justice has made significant progress to-
ward increasing adult obscenity prosecution). "This Depart-
ment is dedicated to vigorously enforcing the laws of the
United States, and those who illegally distribute obscene ma-
terial will be prosecuted aggressively." Id.
191 See id. Attorney General John Ashcroft opened the
symposium by welcoming members outside the Justice De-
partment who were present to support the DOJ's mission to
"combat the proliferation of obscenity in our society." See
began the symposium by announcing that the De-
partment of Justice had done little to combat the
growing outbreak of online obscenity over the
past decade. 90 The symposium brought together
members of government agencies, interest
groups, and lawyers to devise a "common and co-
ordinated approach to the prosecution of obscen-
ity providers."'19 1 At the symposium, Ashcroft as-
serted the importance of the public's interests "in
the quality of life," and the "right of the Nation
and the States to maintain a decent society."' 9 2 It
was with these public interests in mind that Ash-
croft announced the first steps in the Justice De-
partment's plan to fight online obscenity. First,
the Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section
("CEOS") of the Department of Justice was
granted an additional one million dollars in re-
sources to hire five information technology ex-
perts and two additional prosecutors. 9 1 Second,
the Attorney General Advisory Committee revised
the U.S. Attorneys' manual to eliminate the "lock-
out" provision.' 94 Since 1998, CEOS was required
to seek the approval of the local U.S. Attorney
before commencing any investigation in any spe-
cific district. 9 5 Now, CEOS can investigate locally
with only a notification of the need to do so to the
U.S. Attorney in whose district the investigation is
conducted. 19 Third, according to the recently
Ashcroft Memo, supra note 1. These members included Steve
Takeshita, Organized Crime and Vice Division of the Los An-
geles Police Department; Ray Smith, Postal Inspector; Jay
Sekulow, Chief Counsel for the American Center for Law
and Justice; Bruce Taylor, President and Chief Counsel for
the National Law Center for Children and Families; and
Donna Rice Hughes, author of Kids Online: Protecting Your
Children in Cyberspace. Id.
192 See Obenberger, supra note 5 (reporting the Attorney
General observed that obscenity has tremendous conse-
quences for our broader society). "[C] linical and experimen-
tal evidence show a correlation between exposure to sexually
violent materials and an increase in aggressive behavior to-
wards women." Id.
193 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 1.
194 Id.
195 See Obenberger, supra note 5 (declaring the main
point of the lockout provision was that a local U.S. Attorney
was best prepared to know what kinds of material were con-
victable obscenity under local standards and therefore best
equipped to determine which investigations would be a waste
of time); see also Ashcroft Memo, supra note 1 (stating the
lockout provision impeded the Department of Justice's ef-
forts to prosecute obscenity cases). At the recommendation
of the Advisory Committee, Ashcroft approved this change in
the manual in April 2002. Id.
196 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 1 (stating that the elimi-
nation of the lockout provision should not be interpreted as
an indication that CEOS will be the sole prosecutor of ob-
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updated CEOS website, the Justice Department is
recommending a variety of filter programs to pre-
vent child access to pornographic content.' v1 7
Finally, the Justice Department's proposal sup-
ports the implementation of the Child Obscenity
and Pornography Prevention Act of 2002
("COPPA").1 98 On April 16, 2002, the Supreme
Court ruled that the current ban of "virtual" child
pornography and pandering of child pornogra-
phy is unconstitutional in Ashcrofl v. Free Speech Co-
alition.'99 In Free Speech, the majority, by a 7-2 vote,
held that a provision in the 1996 Child Pornogra-
phy Prevention Act ("CPPA") violated the First
Amendment because the statute's definition of
"child pornography" was overbroad.211(° The ma-
jority held that the CPPA would have criminalized
such non-obscene depictions of minors engaged
in sexual activities such as Romeo and Juliet, Traffic,
and Lolita. Therefore, the Court rejected the stat-
ute because it banned both obscene and constitu-
tionally protected speech alike.2111 The COPPA
represents new legislation supported by the Jus-
tice Department that reaffirms the 1996 ban on
so-called "virtual" child pornography.202
It is clear that the Attorney General is aware
that the possibility of completely eliminating the
online obscenity problem is unrealistic. 2°1" Ash-
croft stated his realistic goal at the end of the Sym-
posium: "[a] ny plan to combat obscenity must be-
gin with the realization that the primary goal is
deterrence, born of a well coordinated and well
scenity cases). According to the Attorney General, the prose-
cution of obscenity cases will be a collaborative effort be-
tween CEOS and the U.S. Attorneys' offices. Id.
197 See Child Exploitation and Obscenity Section, Depart-
ment of Justice, Criminal Division, at http://www.usdoj.gov/
criminal/ceos/obscenity.htm (last modified June 27, 2002)
(reporting that the Department of Justice is committed to
taking various approaches to limit online obscenity). The
CEOS website suggests the use of commercially available
software "filter" programs to prevent access to websites con-
taining offensive content. Id.
198 See Child Obscenity and Pornography Prevention Act
of 2002, H.R. 4623, 107th Cong (2002), at http://
www.house.gov/cannon/bills200l/hr4623.htm (last visited
Sept. 5, 2003).
199 535 U.S. 234 (2002) (holding that a provision in the
CPPA which banned virtual child pornography-that is,
child pornography made with morphed computer images or
without using real children-was unconstitutional because it
violated the First Amendment).
200 Id.
2(1 Id. at 1401. The Court also held that the COPPA was
unconstitutional for covering a broad array of pornographic
material involving computer-generated images or youthful-
looking adults instead of actual children engaged in sexual
executed strategy . . . . [W] e can and we will
change the pattern of behavior by aggressive law
enforcement."2' 4 But how well coordinated and
well executed is Ashcroft's strategy?
B. Challenging the DOJ Plan
The Justice Department's plan to attack and
prosecute distributors of online obscenity in es-
sence mirrors the strategy Congress used when
drafting the CDA, COPA, and CIPA.2° 5 Senator
Patrick Leahy made a statement on child pornog-
raphy in front of the Senate Judiciary Committee
on October 2, 2002.20c Leahy acknowledged that
the Justice Department has the same goals as Con-
gress-"we are all against child pornography-
that vote would be an easy one."20 7 But unlike the
Department of Justice, Leahy declared that Con-
gress was concerned about finding legislative solu-
tions that not only made politicians look tough on
online obscenity, but that could also withstand
"the test of time and the scrutiny of the courts."2 °8
Senator Leahy recognized that, in order for gov-
ernment efforts to survive, such efforts need to
strongly consider the standards that have been set
out repeatedly by the U.S. Supreme Court.2091
Leahy described the Justice Department's plan as
just another "quick fix" that does not pay atten-
tion to constitutional limits.2 10
There are several aspects of the Justice Depart-
ment's attack on online obscenity plan that are
activities. Id.
202 See Press Release, Office of Congressman Chris Can-
non, Cannon Introduces Legislation to Protect Children
Child Pornography Banned In New Bill, at http://
www.house.gov/cannon/press2002/may02.htm (last modi-
fied May 2, 2002).
210'l Sekulow, supra note 189.
204 Id.
205 Stopping Child Pornography Statement, supra note 180
("Everyone wants to protect our children, but we need to do
it with laws .. .that stick.").
206 Id.
207 Id.
208 Id. ("We need a law with teeth, but not one with false
teeth.").
209 Id. ("We should not have been surprised on this
Committee [that previous attempts at legislation] were un-
constitutional. Now, with varying legislative proposals before
us, we must work together to not repeat our earlier mis-
takes.").
21) Id. (commenting that Leahy reported that after con-
ferring with Constitutional law experts and law professors on
the matter, they confirmed that the Justice Department's
proposal will not pass the Supreme Court's First Amendment
scrutiny).
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problematic. First, as this comment has already
addressed, filtering programs have been widely re-
garded as considerably lacking. 2 1' That the Justice
Department ignores this obvious criticism repre-
sents a general lack of initiative on its part to ex-
plore different ways to screen websites from chil-
dren.2 1 2 In addition, the Justice Department's
plan to eliminate the "lockout" provision and al-
low any U.S. Attorney the ability to investigate lo-
cally in any jurisdiction without seeking the ap-
proval of the local U.S. Attorney is simply an ex-
ample of recipient jurisdiction. This comment has
already confirmed that this method would cause a
substantial chilling effect on the expression of
ideas on the Internet.21 3 If each cyberspace user
must govern his speech in accordance with all
possible local communities, then much will re-
main unexpressed online for fear of being prose-
cuted by a U.S. Attorney in some "recipient's juris-
diction." In such a case, the free flow of ideas on
the Internet will largely be impaired.2 14
Finally, Senator Leahy, in his statement to the
Senate Judiciary Committee on Child Pornogra-
phy, discussed the three most problematic aspects
of the Justice Department's COPPA proposal. 2 15
First, its most glaring omission is that it fails to in-
corporate the Supreme Court's doctrine of ob-
scenity into the definition of "child pornogra-
phy. '21 6 The problem with this approach is that it
is essentially the same one taken by Congress in
the CPPA, which was invalidated by the Supreme
Court because the proper terminology was ne-
glected.2 1 7 As it stands, the Department's proposal
will simply result in another round of cases chal-
lenging the law and ultimately will be thrown out
by the Supreme Court for the same reasons.2 1t
Thus, the main problem with the Department's
211 See generally Jon Bigness, Sifting Problems of Web Filters,
CHI. TRIB., Feb. 16, 1998, at I (reporting that filtering
software effectiveness depends in large part on the sensitivity
of the software publishers to obscene material because they
ultimately choose which sites are inappropriate for children).
212 This comment will explore in greater detail how the
FCC can pursue some of these more tmnique alternatives to
filtering programs. See, e.g., Section VII, Part B.
213 See infra Section III, Part C.
214 See Erik G. Swenson, Redefining Community Standards
in Light of the Geographic Limitless of the Internet: A Critique of
United States v. Thomas, 82 MINN. L. REV. 855 (1998).
215 Stopping Child Pornography Statement, supra note 180.
216 Id. ("Not even one provision takes that approach,
which would at least ensure that some of the law was upheld
[when reviewed by the Supreme Court].").
217 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234 ("The CPPA, how-
proposal is that, in avoiding the parameters set
out by the Supreme Court, the COPPA amounts
to the same "political sound bite" legislation that
was drafted by Congress and invalidated many
times before. 219 For example, although a section
in the COPPA is entitled "Obscene Visual Depic-
tions of Young Children," the Department has
avoided discussing the "obscenity" requirement
established by Miller v. California.2 2 0 As Senator
Leahy points out, "[h]eadlines and titles like
'prepubescent' and 'obscene' are popular, but
will not fool our federal judges when there is no
obscenity requirement in the statute itself, [but]
only in the title."2 21 Finally, the proposed statute
contains no requirement that the material be
judged "as a whole for artistic, literary, or scien-
tific value," which was an essential issue in the Su-
preme Court's invalidation of the CPPA in Free
Speech.222 Ultimately, the proposed provisions of
the COPPA, according to Senator Leahy, invite "a
parade of legitimate movies and scientific or edu-
cational materials that may be covered by the
overbreadth of the provision to challenge the leg-
islation."2 23 Based on this review, it is clear that
the Department ofJustice's plan to aggressively at-
tack online obscenity represents a similar ap-
proach to Congress' failed legislation, and there-
fore another method of regulation is clearly
needed.
VII. THE EXPERT AGENCY
A. Is Regulation Even Possible?
Many have argued that a regulatory scheme de-
signed to prevent obscenity from being dissemi-
nated over the Internet simply is not possible. 224
ever, extends to images that appear to depict a minor engag-
ing in sexually explicit activity without regard to the Miller
requirements.").
218 Stopping Child Pornography Statement, supra note 180
("America's children deserve ... a good faith .. .effort to
come up with a law that will survive judicial scrutiny and pro-
tect them for years to come.").
219 Id.
220 Id.
221 Id.
222 Free Speech Coalition, 535 U.S. 234.
2 23 Stopping Child Pornography Statement, supra note
180.
224 See Leonard J. Kennedy & Lori A Zallaps, If It Ain't
Broke... The FCC And Internet Regulation, 7 COMMLAW CON-
SPECTUS 17 (1999) [hereinafter Kennedy].
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Proponents of an unregulated Internet contend
that the Internet is too large and complex, and
any attempt to control its content would be fu-
tile. 225 Therefore, a threshold question needs to
be answered: is regulation of obscenity online
even possible? According to many legal commen-
tators, a regime that regulates online obscenity
makes a great deal of sense and, under the right
circumstances, may indeed be possible. 22"6
The FCC is a service-based organization,227 and
as such, its regulatory philosophy is simple: the
agency must follow the laws that Congress
passes.228 Thus, before detailing how the FCC can
help regulate obscene content, it is necessary to
first address how Congress should amend its past
mistakes and draft lasting legislation. First, the
regulation must be clear and narrow. 229 Congress
has fallen victim to vagueness and overbreadth in
the past in attempting to wipe out all sexually ex-
plicit and obscene communication on the In-
ternet.230
Next, Congress needs to consider how liability
is going to be extended to the distributor of the
obscene material. As this comment has illustrated,
efforts to impose the "contemporary community
standards" in the Miller test to a virtual world are
arguably outdated. 23' Congress should establish a
"virtual community standard" because the In-
ternet is a non-physical space that acts as the pri-
mary community to its users.232 The two keys to
this standard are notice and accountability. 233
When Congress answers the specific questions re-
quired to set up a "virtual community standard,"
potential distributors of obscene or indecent ma-
terial will know exactly what standards will be used
to judge their actions, as well as exactly which ju-
225 Id.
226 See Cass Sunstein, The First Amendment in Cyberspace,
104 YALE L.J. 1757, 1799 (1995); see also Angela E. Wu, Spin-
ning a Tighter Web: The First Amendment and Internet Regulation,
17 N. ILL. U. L. REv. 263 (1997) (commenting on how sexu-
ally-explicit information should be regulated on the In-
ternet).
227 Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1799.
228 See Kennedy, supra note 224, at 17 (discussing that
the FCC needs to honor Congressional intent when posi-
tioned with the task of regulating obscenity on the Internet);
see also 47 U.S.C. §230(b) (2) ("It is the policy of the United
States to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market
that presently exists for the Internet and other interactive
computer services, unfettered by Federal or State regula-
tion.").
229 Kaplin, supra note 107, at 172.
230 Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1800.
risdictions they are to be held accountable. 234
Finally, Congress must realize that complete
bans on content have never been acceptable, and
thus the legislature needs to consider how to ef-
fectively control the distribution of obscene
materials online. 235 There is essentially no consti-
tutional problem with banning materials online
that are by definition "obscene," because these
materials do not receive any constitutional protec-
tion regardless of whether they are on the In-
ternet or anywhere else. 236 However, when Con-
gress considers drafting legislation that extends
beyond the "obscene," to include "indecent,"
"offensive," or "lewd" content, they run the risk of
being unconstitutionally vague or overbroad by
prohibiting protected speech. 23 7 Consequently,
Congress needs to establish a precise government
objective. 238 In this case, as the Department of
Justice has asserted, their strongest justification
for regulation is the protection of children from
harmful materials. 23 ' Regulation designed to pre-
vent child exploitation and victimization should
not be declared unconstitutional because "solici-
tations to engage in unlawful activity are unpro-
tected by the First Amendment, whether they oc-
cur on the Internet or anywhere else."2 4 11
However, it is when the government goes be-
yond "solicitation," and attempts to ban indecent
content that it must be extremely cautious. 24' In
attempting to regulate "indecent" speech, the
question that needs to be considered in order to
pass judicial scrutiny is whether the government
has chosen the least restrictive means for achiev-
ing their stated goal of preventing child exploita-
tion. 242 In drafting such legislation, Congress
would bear the burden to prove that most existing
231 See infra Section III, Part C.
232 Byassee, supra note 68, at 198-199.
233 Branscomb, supra note 80, at 1645 (noting that ac-
countability refers to the acceptance of responsibility for
one's actions and without it, there can be no basis upon
which an injured party could ever seek relief).
234 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1010-1011.
235 Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1800.
236 Miller, 413 U.S. 15.
237 Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 729.
238 Kaplin, supra note 107, at 172.
239 Ashcroft Memo, supra note I (asserting that obscenity
on the Internet can lead to child exploitation and sexual vio-
lence as child molesters often use obscene materials to se-
duce their prey by lowering the inhibitions of their victims).
24) Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1801.
241 Id.
242 Kaplin, supra note 107, at 172.
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alternatives are not effective and therefore the
ban on indecent speech is necessary to promote
its goals. As one commentator put it:
[t]he impact of regulations like the CDA and COPA,
complete with content-based restrictions and such
vague words as 'indecent' and 'patently offensive,' is
chilled speech. Regulations fail when the chilled
speech is constitutional, when the speech outweighs the
asserted compelling justifications for the regulations,
and when the regulations are not narrowly tailored to
meet these compelling justifications. 243
While this kind of analysis hinges on technologi-
cal advances, it is safe to assume that any complete
ban on indecent speech would be found unconsti-
tutional. This is so because alternatives, even if
somewhat ineffective, will almost always exist.2 44
It is in this area that Congress may rely on the ex-
pertise of the FCC to merge the notions of tech-
nology and law to promote the government's in-
terest in protecting children from obscene as well
as indecent speech. The following is a brief analy-
sis of the manner in which the FCC can use its
expertise to test less onerous alternatives. If these
methods prove to be effective, then Congress and
the FCC can continue to work together to use the
technology available to control the distribution of
indecent content online. If these methods do not
work, however, Congress will have at least met its
burden in proving that the alternative options
were not effective and, together with the FCC's as-
sistance, ban indecent speech and enforce the law
against those who violate it.
B. Defining the FCC's Role
1. Reach Out to Trade Organizations
Perhaps the most significant reason the FCC is
most qualified to handle the merging of technol-
ogy and cyberspace law is that it is the "expert
agency" for dealing with both communications
and new media.2 45 As stated, any regulation that
243 Philip T.K. Daniel & Dr. Patrick Pauken, The Electronic
Media and School Violence: Lessons Learned and Issues Presented,
W. EDuc. L. REP. (June 20, 2002).
244 Kaplin, supra note 107, at 172.
245 See In re Application of WorldCom, Inc. and MCI
Communications Corp. for Transfer of Control of MCI Com-
munications Corp. to WorldCom, Inc., Separate Statement of
Commissioner Michael Powell, Memorandum Opinion and Or-
der, 13 F.C.C. Rcd. 18,025 (1998) (announcing that Congress
gave broad authority to the FCC as an "expert agency" and
thus Congress should rely on the FCC's "unique capabilities"
on subjects related to communications).
246 Id.
deals with content-based speech, like obscene and
indecent speech, will have serious implications on
the First Amendment.246 To answer the question
of whether the government has shown the least
restrictive alternative in pursuing its interest de-
pends in large part on the state of the technol-
ogy.247 As the technology continues to advance,
an important factual question must be addressed
periodically: what sorts of technological alterna-
tives exist by which the government could utilize
what represents a less onerous alternative than
strictly banning indecent speech?248 The commu-
nications and new technology industries are very
complex and highly technical. The FCC, as a "ser-
vice-based" organization, has the ability to reach
out to trade associations and consumer groups to
compile the necessary data needed to make such
an inquiry on a regular basis. The Internet contin-
ues to revolutionize the way we communicate, and
only the FCC has the relevant expertise and daily
industry contacts to ensure a close watch on the
emerging technology. 249
2. Complaints to FCC Website
If Congress were to narrowly tailor this new leg-
islation aimed at regulating obscene and indecent
speech on the Internet, they would need some
practical way to locate this content online. The In-
ternet and the online community continue to
grow at an alarming rate. 250 Beyond general en-
forcement, how can the FCC help Congress reach
these obscene and indecent sites if the Internet is
so seemingly infinite? Congress should use the
FCC as a forum to entrust and empower those
who confront these problems on a daily basis.2 5'
Any successful policy in regulating content on the
Internet needs to start with a "bottom-up" ap-
proach that begins with parents, schools, and li-
247 Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1802.
248 Kaplin, supra note 107, at 172.
249 Kriegar, supra note 137, at 23.
251) See Internet Software Consortium, Internet Domain Sur-
vey, at http://www.isc.org/ds/WWW-200207/index.html
(last visited Sept. 10, 2003) (citing statistics that show that the
number of Internet hosts as of July 2002 was up to
162,128,493).
251 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1023 ("Parents in the
home need to be both educated and empowered; school offi-
cials must be given support and tools; local libraries must be
encouraged to develop successful policies and acquire inno-
vative tools.").
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braries at the local level, not in Washington. 252
The FCC can help empower those who confront
this content most often by providing a forum in
which they can report what they find on the In-
ternet. Under an enforcement link on their web-
site, the FCC could create a report form that al-
lows an individual to register what they think may
be an offending website. These reports could pro-
vide a convenient means for the individual to
electronically send the FCC the offending website,
and check off criteria listed on the form to iden-
tify what appears to be either obscene or inde-
cent. In addition to providing these reports, the
FCC could provide on their website a practical ex-
planation of the law as well as a "Parent's Guide to
Internet Safety," similar to the brochure pub-
lished by the FBI, which contains tips on recogniz-
ing and correcting problems, law enforcement in-
formation, and other resources. 253 In handling
these complaints, the FCC could determine
whether the offending website actually does vio-
late Congress' laws. If the FCC decides that the
site merits further investigation by law enforce-
ment officials, it can refer the information that it
has collected to an appropriate U.S. Attorney to
initiate prosecution.
One of the challenges for Congress has always
been to avoid the symbolic "top-down" approach
and instead address the problem practically, by
starting from the bottom and putting some re-
sponsibility in the hands of members of local com-
munities-such as, parents, schools, and librar-
ies.2 54 With this approach, Congress' goal of pro-
tecting children is much more likely to be effec-
tive because it allows everyone, not just
lawmakers, to get involved and join in the fight
against online obscenity. And the FCC, as the gov-
ernment's expert communications agency, pro-
vides an ideal forum to start such an initiative.
252 See Federal Bureau of Investigation, A Parents Guide to
Internet Safety, at http://www.fbi.gov/publications/pguide/
pguide.htm (last visited Sept. 10, 2003).
253 Id.
254 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1030 ("If Congress truly
cares about doing something, they should entrust and em-
power local communities.").
255 Id.
256 O'Rourke, supra note 17, at 701.
257 Alexander, supra note 6, at 1029 (acknowledging that
such a voluntary rating system might be difficult because
most individuals would be hesitant to sign a voluntary agree-
ment).
258 See Jonathan Weinberg, Rating the Net, 19 HASTINGS
COMM. & ENT. L.J. 453 (1997) (commenting that with the
3. Cyber-zoning and Website Rating
Congress should encourage citizens at the local
community level to participate in the fight against
obscenity on the Internet, but obviously it should
not rely solely on such efforts of local self-regula-
tion to solve the problem alone.255 Another sys-
tem that Congress and the FCC could encourage
would be a program deploying website ratings
and "cyber-zoning."256 While the government
would not be able to mandate such a solution, it
could offer federal incentives to website hosts that
encourage a voluntary rating system similar to the
one the Motion Picture Association of America
uses to rate its movies. 25 7 Although getting web
hosts to sign a voluntary agreement might prove
challenging, if the federal incentives were appeal-
ing enough, the FCC could play a large role in
federalizing filter programs. Instead of attempting
to sort content by language, which has proven in-
effective, a filtering program would instead filter
only certain indecent websites that possess consti-
tutionally protected speech, but are rated as such
so that children could not be able to access them
online using the software.25
An effective system of web rating and filtering
could lead to a time when Congress and the FCC
could facilitate a program of "cyber-zoning." In
light of the fact that the Supreme Court has per-
mitted zoning ordinances that isolated the loca-
tion of adult-oriented businesses to stand,25 9 it
might be possible to "cyber-zone" pornography
and other indecent content through a ".xxx" do-
main name.26 11 If the system proved effective,
other top-level domain names like "adult," or
"kids" would allow for much easier screening and
limit the potential of children inadvertently acces-
sing indecent websites.26 1
proper blocking technology, like websites with ratings, filter
programs could be very accurate).
259 See City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, 475 U.S. 41
(1986) (finding a zoning ordinance prohibiting adult thea-
tres from moving within 1,000 square feet of residential areas
constitutional because the ordinance was designed to pre-
vent crime, protect city's retail, and maintain property val-
ues).
260 Id.
261 Kriegar, supra note 137, at 25 n.35 (reporting that in
2000, the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and
Numbers ("ICANN") approved the addition of seven domain
names: ".aero," ".biz," ".coop," ".info," ".museum," ".name,"
and ".pro").
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VIII. CONCLUSION: WHY IS THIS IN THE
"PUBLIC INTEREST?"
The rulemaking and enforcement powers and
duties of the Federal Communication Commis-
sion are always subject to "the public interest test."
This test dictates that, from time to time, as "pub-
lic convenience, interest, or necessity requires,"
the Commission may make and enforce rules that
are not inconsistent with the Act.262 How can one
determine whether the regulation of online ob-
scenity and indecency is within the public inter-
est? The consideration of a highly publicized case
involving cyberporn lends much insight. A stu-
dent at the University of Michigan is alleged to
have written and distributed a fictitious story in-
volving another student at the University. In this
story, where the subject character was explicitly
named, the student was raped, tortured, and fi-
nally killed. The story is obscene, violent, and
threatening-and moreover, it is disseminated
over the Internet.263 It is time for Congress and
262 47 U.S.C §303(r).
263 See Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1799 (inquiring as to
which current federal law would apply to this conduct and if
there should be new federal online regulatory law that would
provide a cause of action); see also Peter H. Lewis, Writer Ar-
the FCC to work together to create federal law
that provides the means to regulate this kind of
speech on the Internet and enforce such regula-
tion against those who violate the law.264 Public
officials and lawmakers alike have all determined
that it is within the public interest to criminalize
those that disseminate obscene content on the In-
ternet.
The central point of this comment has been
that the Internet need not be, as Attorney Gen-
eral Ashcroft referred to it, a "double-edge
sword."2 65 Congress and the Department of Jus-
tice must accept that the online obscenity prob-
lem deserves more than a "quick fix" and that po-
litically expedient answers simply will not work
anymore. If Congress relied on the FCC to assist
them in enforcing lasting legislation that criminal-
izes obscenity online, then the uninhibited free
expression of constitutionally protected speech
could continue to thrive on the Internet.
rested After Sending Violent Fiction Over Internet, N.Y. , Feb. 11,
1995, at A10.
264 Sunstein, supra note 226, at 1800.
265 Ashcroft Memo, supra note 1.
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